Quantum theory is derived from a set of plausible assumptions related to the following general setting: For a given system there is a set of experiments that can be performed, and for each such experiment an ordinary statistical model is defined. The parameters of the single experiments are functions of a hyperparameter, which defines the state of the system. There is a symmetry group acting on the hyperparameters, and for the induced action on the parameters of the single experiment a simple consistency property is assumed, called permissibility of the parametric function. The other assumptions needed are rather weak. The derivation relies partly on quantum logic, partly on a group representation of the hyperparameter group, where the invariant spaces are shown to be in 1-1 correspondence with the equivalence classes of permissible parametric functions. Planck's constant only plays a role connected to generators of unitary group representations.
Introduction.
The two great revolutions in physics at the beginning of this century -relativity and quantum mechanics -still influence nearly all aspects of theoretical physics. Similar as they may be, both in their impact on modern science and in the way they in their time turned conventional ideas upside down, there are also of course great differences -both in origin, appearance and type of content. Relativity theory was founded by one man, Einstein, while the ideas of quantum theory developed over time through the work of many people, most notably Planck, Bohr, Schrodinger, Heisenberg, Pauli and Dirac. An equally important -and perhaps related -aspect, is the following: Relativity theory can be developed logically from a few intuitively clear, nearly obvious, concepts and axioms, essentially only constancy of the speed of light and invariance of physical laws under change of coordinate system, while quantum theory still has a rather awkward foundation in its abstract concepts for states and observables.
During the years, several attempts of a deeper foundation of quantum theory have been made; some of these we will return to later. Although there is far from a universal agreement on the foundation, today's physicists, both theoretical and experimental, have developed a clear intuition directly connected to states of a system as rays in a complex Hilbert space and observables as selfadjoint operators in the same space. The theory has had success in very many fields -some claim that quantum theory is the most successfull physical theory ever advanced, but it has also met problems: Difficulties with defining the border between object and observer in von Neuman's quantum measurement theory; difficulties with interpretations requiring many worlds or action at a distance; infinities in quantum field theory requiring complicated renormalization programs; difficulties in reconciling the theory with general relativity and so on. We will of course not try to attack all these problems here. What we will assert, though, is that the fact that such difficulties occur, does make it legitimate to look at the foundation of the theory with fresh eyes again. One way to do this, is to try to find a foundation which is in accordance with common sense. Another way is to compare ~t with another, apparently unrelated, theoretical area. In this paper we will try to combine both these lines of attack.
A vital clue is the role of probability in quantum theory. In the beginning, this was an aspect that overshadowed all other difficulties in the theory, and that made leading physicists -first of them Einstein himself -sceptical: The new physical laws were then and are still claimed to be probabilistic by necessity. Still some people are looking at hidden variable theories in attempts to avoid the fact that the fundamental laws of nature are stochastic, but after the experiments of Aspect et al. (1982) and other overwhelming evidence, most scientists seem to accept stochasticity of nature as an established fact.
I
At the same time, statistical science has developed methodology that has found applications in an increasing number of empirical sciences, methodology largely based upon stochastic modelling. With this background, the obvious, but apparently very difficult question then is: Why has there been virtually no scientific contact between physicists and statisticians throughout this century? This lack of contact is in fact very strikening. At the same time as Dirac was developing a foundation for relativistic quantum theory in Cambridge in England, R.A. Fisher completely independently developed the foundation of statistical inference theory based upon probability models in Rothamsted and London. While modern quantum field theory was developed by Feynman in Princeton and Schwinger in Harvard, J. Neyman and coworkers lay the foundation of modern statistical inference theory in Berkeley. One of the few early contacts that I know of is Feynman's (1951) Berkeley Symposium paper on the interpretation of probabilities in quantum mechanics. Today, quantum theory sometimes has its own session at large international statistical conferences, but the language spoken there is of a nature which is difficult to understand for ordinary statisticians. Meyer's (1993) book on non-commutative probability theory may be seen as an attempt to make a synthesis of the two worlds, but this book does not address the foundation question, at least if we seek a foundation related to common sense. It is also becoming increasingly apparent that there are similarities between advanced probability theory and quantum theory, but these similarities seem to be mostly at the formal level.
The lack of a common ground for modern physics and statistics is even more surprising when we know that the outcome of any single experiment with fixed experimental arrangement can always be described by ordinary probability models, also in the world of particle physics. It is in cases where several arrangements are possible, as when one has the choice between measuring position and momentum of a particle, that quantum mechanics gives results which cannot be reached by ordinary probability theory. In addition, quantum theory gives definite rules for computing probabilities, also in cases where the ordinary probability concept can be used in principle.
We will formulate below an extended experimental setting, which includes the possible decisions which must be made before the experiment itself is carried out, at least before the final inference is made. We will look at the situation where strong symmetries exist both within the single experiments and in the wider experimental setting between the single experiments. This, together with other reasonable assumptions, will lead to probability models of the type found in ordinary quantum mechanics.
The physical implications of this theory, at least in its non-relativistic variant are not expected to differ considerably from existing quantum theory; basic mathematical equivalence will be discussed later. Our main contribution here is mainly to propose a simpler and more intuitive foundation. The really interesting further challenge seems to be the question of finding a corresponding relativistic theory. This issue will not be pursued here, but in light of the importance of symmetry groups in high energy physics, it seems very plausible that it should be possible to develop the approach in this direction, too. A brief discussion on this will be given in the last section.
Our aim is to write the paper in such a way that the main principles can be appreciated both by theoretical physisists, mathematicians and statisticians. Technical details at several points are unavoidable, however. Also, even though we will try to be fairly precise, at least in the main results, there may still be room for improvement in mathematical rigor. What we feel are the most important a.ssumptions, are stated explicitly. Minor technical assumptions are stated in the text.
Experimental setting.
The common statistical framework for analyzing an experiment is a sample space X, listing the possible experimental outcomes, a fixed a-algebra (Boolean algebra) :F of subsets of X, and a cla.ss {P9; 0 E 8} of probability measures on the measurable space (X, .F). The parameter 0 -or a function of this parameter -is ordinarily the unknown quantity which the statistician aims at saying something about using the outcome of the experiment. A fixed 0, or alternatively, a probability distribution expressing prior knowledge about 0, may also be related to the phycisist's concept of 'state'. A simple purpose of a statistical experiment might be to estimate 0, which formally means to select a function 0 on the sample space X such that 0( x) is a reasonable estimate of 0 when the observation x is given. There is a considerable literature on statistical inference; three good and thorough books with different perspectives are Berger (1985) , Lehmann (1983) and Cox and Hinkley (1974) . Both at the more specialized and at the more elementary level there are very many books, of course. An important point is that intuition related to statistical m~thodology in this ordinary sense has been developed in a large number of empirical sciences, also in parts of experimental physics.
A very general approach to statistics assumes a decision theoretical framework:
First, a space D of possible decisions is defined, given the experimental outcome; for instance, D can consist of different estimators of 0. Then a loss function L (O, d(·) ) is specified, giving the loss by taking the decision d when the true parameter is 0. The choice of decision is typically done by minimizing the expected loss. By restricting the class of decision functions so that they posess invariance properties, or so that estimators have the correct expectation, this can often be done uniformly over the I I unknown parameter. Another possible course -gammg increasing popularity -is to assume a prior probability distribution over the parameter space, and then base inference on the corresponding posterior distribution, given the data. This is called the Bayesian approach. Essential for what follows, is that we will extend the traditional statistical framework to include possible actions taken by an experimenter before or during a given experiment. The most important actions for our purposes are those that label the whole experiment, and thus allows different experiments to be done in the same situation. However, we will also allow actions that change the class of probability measures, the space of decisions and/ or the loss function.
Thus we start with a space A of possible actions, and for each a E A we have an experiment fa, consisting of a probability model (Xa, Fa, {P 0 ; 8 E 8a}) , and· possibly a loss function La(·,·) and a space Da of potential decisions. In macroscopic experiments such actions are in fact very common. They are not usually explicitly taken into account in the statistical analysis, but are taken as fixed once and for all, an attitude which is fairly obvious in some cases, but absolutely can be discussed in other cases. In fact, more can be said, also in the ordinary statistical setting, for a closer link between the experimental design phase (choosing a) and the statistical analysis phase. A partial list of possibilities for choosing a include:
(a) Choice between a number of essentially different experiments that are possible to perform in a given situation.
(b) Choice of target population, and way to select experimental units, including choice of randomization. Choice of conditioning in models is related to these issues.
(c) Choice of treatments. Here are many variants: There are lots of examples of medical treatments which are mutually exclusive. In factorial experiments the choice of factors and the levels of these are important issues.
(d) A choice between different statistical models; for instance, one may want to reduce the number of parameters if the model is to complicated to give firm decisions. In fact, this is permissible under certain conditions.
(e) Factorial experiments often turn out to be unbalanced, more specifically, nonorthogonal: If nii denotes the number of experimental units having level i if factor I and level j of factor J, then the statistical analysis is simple only if nij = ni.n.i/n .. , where the dots denote summation. If this is not the case, the experiment is said to be nonorthogonal. Then the consecutive order of the factors influence the conclusion, so this must be decided upon. This choice affects only the loss function and the decision space, not the probability model. Simpson's famous paradox (see Gudder, 1988 , for references and for a discussion from the point of view of quantum theory) is a related issue. Even though factorial experiments with many factors used on the same units -if possible -is known both from experience and from statistical theory I to be very efficient, the theoretical discussion in the present paper is more related to the situation where one uses one or a few factors at the time, and the performs consecutive experiments. One should have in mind, however, that by proper division of units, a single experiment can also be looked upon in this way.
The main purpose of this paper will be to explore the relationship between macroscopic statistical modelling and the microscopic modelling we find in the quantum mechanical world. In the latter one definitively has the choice between performing different experiments, say, measuring position or moment or measuring sp1ri in different directions. The quantum mechanical state of a particle or a particle system can be used to predict the outcome of any given of these experiments, once the choice is made. In this way one might say that the quantum mechanical state vector contains the simultaneous model of a large set of possible statistical experiments t'a (a E A).-A major reason why this is possible, is that the situation contains a high degree of symmetry. To study the connection between quantum mechanics and statistics more directly, it turns out, however, to be useful first to consider a simpler representation than the ordinary Hilbert space representation of quantum mechanics.
3 The lattice approach to quantum theory.
Mathematically, a u-lattice is defined as a partially ordered set £ such that the infimum and supremum (with respect to the given ordering) of every countable subset exist and belong to £. In this section we will summarize the approach to quantum mechanics taking lattices of propositions as points of departure. These can be looked upon as generalizations of the u-algebras of classical probability, where the propositions are subsets of a given space X, ordered by set inclusion; the term Boolean algebra is sometimes used for the same concept. For Boolean algebras, the partial ordering corresponds to set inclusion, and infimum and supremum corresponds to intersection and union, respectively. In the following we will mainly consider (complete) lattices, where the infimum and supremum of all subsets, not only the countable ones, exist.
The lattice approach to quantum mechanics consists of formulating a number of axioms for a lattice which is weaker than the set of axioms needed to define a Boolean algebra, just sufficiently weak that they are satisfied by the set of projections in a Hilbert space, which are the entities that represent propositions in conventional quantum mechanics. We will follow largely Beltrametti and Cassinelli (1981) in presenting these axioms. It is relatively easy to prove that the axioms below actually are satisfied by Hilbert space projections, much more difficult to show that the axioms by necessity imply that the lattice has a Hilbert space representation. We proceed with the necessary definitions; in the next section we will try to relate these definitions to sets of potential experiments as formulated above.
We have already defined a lattice £ as a set of propositions {P} with a partial A much stronger requirement is that the distributive laws should hold for all triples:
An orthocomplemented distributive lattice is in general a Boolean algebra, and can always be realized as an algebra of subsets of a fixed set.
The lattices of quantum mechanics are orthocomplemented, but nondistributive; they only satisfy the weaker requirement of being orthomodular. Much of the pioneering work in the lattice approach to quantum mechanics is due to Mackey (1963) . Two books on orthomodular lattices are Beran (1985) and Kalmbach (1983) . This represents an approach to quantum mechanics that in some sense is more primitive than most other approaches, but there are still concepts here, like the lattice property or orthomodularity, which are difficult to get an intuitive relation to. Our aim here will be to try to understand these concepts to some extent in terms of ordinary statistical models for a set of potential experiments and in terms of symmetry properties.
I
In addition to orthomodularity, two further properties are required by Beltrametti and Cassinelli (1981) : The lattices are assumed to be atomic and to have the covering property.
A nonzero element Po of£ is called an atom if 0 ::; P ::; Po implies P = 0 or P = P0 . The lattice £ is called atomic if there always for P ::j:. 0 exists an atom Po such that Po ::; P. It can be shown that if £ is an orthomodular, atomic lattice, then every element of £ is the union of the atoms that it contains. If the lattice is separable, this union is at most countable.
We say that £ has the covering property if for every PI in £ and every atom Po
In total, the kind of propositional structure which is promoted in Beltrametti and Cassinelli (1981) as a basis for quantum mechanics is an orthocomplemented, orthomodular, separable lattice which is atomic and has the covering property. All these requirements are proved to hold for the lattice of projection operators in a separable Hilbert space, or equivalently, the lattice of all closed subspaces of the Hilbert space.
One can also prove results in the opposite direction, though this is much more difficult: If the given requirements hold for some lattice, then one can construct an isomorphic Hilbert space in the sense that the projections upon subspaces of this Hilbert space are in one-to-one correspondence with the propositions of the lattice, with corresponding ordering. The proof of this last result is only hinted at in Beltrametti and Cassinelli (1981) ; more details are given in Piron (1976) and in Maeda and Maeda (1970) . Related results can also be found in Vara.darajan (1985) . One problem is to convince oneself that the complex number field is the natural to choose as a basis for the Hilbert space: One can also construct representations based on the real or quaternion number field.
Finally, the concept of state in Quantum mechanics can be defined as a probability measure on the propositions of a lattice. In the Hilbert space representation the famous theorem of Gleason says that all states can be represented by density operators p (positive operators with trace tr(p) = 1) in the sense that the expectation of every observator, represented by a selfadjoint operator A, is given by
tr(Ap).
As is wellknown from probability theory, the set of expectations for all variables determines the set of probability distributions for all variables.
A set of potential statistical experiments.
Let us start by turning to a completely different situation where the concept of 'state' is also being used. Consider a medical patient. One way to make precise what is meant by the state of this patient is to contemplate the potential results of all possible tests that the patient can be exposed to, where the word 'test' is used in a very wide sense, possibly including treatments or parts of treatments. Thus in a concrete setting like this we can imagine a large number of potential experiments, some possibly mutually exclusive, and let the state be defined abstractly as the totality of probability distributions of results from these experiments, or some parameter determining all these probability distributions. A similar concept can be imagined for a set of several medical patients, where randomization and allocation of treatment may be included as part of the potential experiments under consideration. Here, the focus may be on the treatments rather than on the patients, but still the results of the experiments depend upon the state of the patients, and-if we consider a large enough collection of experiments for a large enough collection of patients in the same state -the potential outcomes may hopefully determine these states .
. In general now, fix some concrete experimental setting, and let A be a set of potential experiments, in statistical terminology t:a = ( Xa, :Fa, { P;; 8 E 9a}) with decision space Da and loss function La(O, d(·)) for a EA.
For two experiments E:a and E:a' it may be crucial whether or not these can both be performed on the experimental unit(s) -say the patient-in such a way that one experiment does not disturb the result of the other. There are lots of examples where such disturbance takes place, or where even one experiment may preclude the other: Biopsy of a possible beginning tumour may make the evaluation of a simple medical treatment difficult; a psychiatric patient may be treated by psychopharmica or by classical psychoanalysis, but the evaluation of both approaches on the same patient may be impossible. In other settings, say factorial experiments, similar phenomena occur: An industrial experiment with a fixed set of units may be performed with one given set of factors or another set, not orthogonal to the first one, but including both sets will lead to a different experiment. The effect of nitrogen in some fertilizer , may be evaluated in a small fixed experiment with or without potassium present, not both. We will assume that for any pair a and a' it is always possible to decide whether or not these experiments can be performed simultaneously without disturbing each other. If this is the case, we say that the experiments are compatible. Two compatible experiments can always be joined into a compound experiment by taking cartesian product: fa 0 fa,= (Xa,:Fa, {P 0 ;8 E 8a}) 0 (Xa',:Fa'' {P;';O E 8a'}), similarly for larger sets of experiments. Sometimes the parameter set for the joint experiment can be simplified in such cases.
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In fact we will assume that all potential experiments that can be performed on a given set of units depend on a common (multidimensional) parameter f/J, defined on a space ci>, and connected to the state of the units. Later we will show that it may be natural instead to associate the state concept to a distribution over ci>, but everything that is said below, in particular the ordering of propositions, can be repeated with states as probability measures. So to keep things reasonably simple, we will keep ¢l fixed in this discussion. (In fact we will do so until Section 10 below.)
Then (} in the experiment Ca is a function of the common parameter fjl, say, (} = 8a ( ¢l); it is assumed that the parameter spaces ci> and 8a are equipped with a-algebras and that each function (} = 8a(¢J) is measurable. Furthermore, it is convenient to assume that each parameter is identifiable: For each a and pair (8, 8'),
Since a-algebras may be coarsened (data reduction), there is a natural partial ordering between the experiments: Say that Ca' :::; Ca if Xa' = Xa and Fa' ~ Fa. Then the probability models are assumed to be consistent: ea' ~ 8a and P;' = P 0 l.r .. , for 8 E 8a'· We will let Ao be the extreme set of experiments on a given set of units, so that for Ca with a E Ao there is no Ca' =/= Ca such that Ca :::; Ca'· With a proposition P we mean an experiment together with an event from this experiment: P = (a, Ea), where Ea belongs to the a-algebra Fa.
A partial ordering of the propositions from the same experiment is first defined as the obvious one: We say that (a, Ela) :::; (a, E2a) if Ela ~ E2a· This ordering will be generalized to some pairs of propositions from different experiments:
Definition 1.
We say that P1 = (a1, Ela 1 ) :::; P2 = (a2, E2a2 ) iff P;: 1 (¢)(Ela1 ) :::; P; .. 2 2 (,p)(E2a2 ) for all state parameters fjl.
In order that P1 :::; P2 and P2 :::; P 1 together shall imply P 1 = P2, we will here identify P1 and P2 _if P;: 1 (¢)(Ela 1 ) = P;: 2 (,p)(E2a 2 ) for all fjl. This may lead to somewhat unfortunate situations where unrelated propositions are identified, but mathematically it is convenient. Among other things it is necessary in order that supremums shall be unique. This definition includes, but may in certain cases also be an extension of, the trivial one when the experiments are the same. -Other cases where P 1 :::; P 2 include: From (i) and (ii) ·it follows that we have to identify all propositions of the form (a, 0) -these will be collected in the single proposition 0, and the propositions of the I form (a, Xa), which will be collected in the single proposition 1. These will be the infimum and supremum, respectively, of the whole set of propositions.
The orthocomplement of a proposition is defined in the straightforward way from the complement of an event: For P = (a, Ea) take pl.. = (a, E~) . It is then clear that pl..l.. = P and that P 1 ~ P 2 implies Pf ~ Pf. From the results of the next section it follows that P 1\ pl.. = 0 and P V pl.. = 1. Thus the properties of an orthocomplementation are satisfied. Sets of propositions from the same experiments will ordinarily have a natural supremum and infimum, corresponding to the usual unions and intersections. To introduce supremum and infimum for arbitrary sets of proposition, however, one needs more structure. We will in fact add more structure by making symmetry assumptions. But first we will show that the simple structure of sets of experiments under weak extra assumptions implies that the set of propositions always will be an orthocomplemented, orthomodular poset.
Orthomodular propositions from experiments.
We start with an assumption which seems rather weak in the general setting we are considering, but also as it stands seems difficult to motivate directly from statistical reasoning. It is closely related to Axiom V in Mackey (1963) , and has been formulated again in several papers in quantum logic. Mq.czynski (1973) showed that this assumption is necessary and sufficient in order that an orthocomplemented poset shall possess some natural properties.
We say that k propositions P 1 , ... , Pk with Pi
holds for all ¢. We say that these propositions are pairwise orthogonal if the same inequality holds for any pair chosen from the k propositions. This is equivalent to Pi ~ Pf for all pairs.
It is clear that orthogonality implies pairwise orthogonality. The opposite implication holds for most other orthogonality concept, but here statistical examples can easily be constructed for which this does not hold. Such cases will be explicitly excluded from our sets of propositions (strictly speaking, we only need this assumption fork= 3 here.) Assumption· 1.
For the propositions under consideration, any set of k pairwise orthogonal propositions is orthogonal.
For events Ei from the same experiment, pairwise orthogonality essentially means EinEj = 0 fori f j. This obviously implies orthogonality in the sense given by (1).
For general sets of proposition, Assumption 1 amounts in some sense to assuming a certain richness of the set models.
For the intermediate Lemma below, we may also need to extend the set of experiments under consideration. This can always be done artificially, since there are no limitations on the set of experiments under consideration, in particular, the set of experiments need not be countable. We will see later how the artificial experiments can be deleted when final results are formulated.
) be k propositions such that (1} holds for all¢. Then there is an experiment fa, = (Xa'• Fa'• {P;'; (} E ea'}) and k pairwise disjoint events Ei in Fa' such that PO,'(¢) (Ei)
In the proof of the Lemma below, we will only make use of Assumption 2 for k = 3, to begin with only for k = 2.
Lemma 1.
Let P 1 = ( a1, E 1) and P2 = ( a2, E2) be two orthogonal propositions in the above sense, i.e.,
Then under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 there exists a proposition P = (a, E) on some experiment fa such that (2)
and we have that P = P1 V P2 for this choice of P.
The existence of P follows by first using Assumption 2. This gives E~ n E2 = 0 for events E~ and E2 in some single experiment. We can then take E = E~ U E7_, so that (2) follows.
It is clear that P ~ P1 and P ~ P2 for this choice of P. Assume that Po is another proposition such that Po ~ P1 and Po ~ P2. Then by Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 with k = 3 there exists an experiment fa, and events Eb, Ef and E!f in Fa' such that Ef ~ Eb, E!f ~ Eb and E~' n E!f = 0. But then it follows that
The basic property of orthomodularity was defined in Section 3 for lattices. This definition requires only a definition of supremum for pairs of orthogonal propositions. Here is the necessary reformulation: Say that a set of propositions is orthomodular
The following result must be seen in relation to Lemma 1. Note that neither Assumption 1 nor Assumption 2 are needed explicitly in the Theorem.
Assume an orthocomplemented poset of propositions based on experiments with the property that pairwise suprema exist and satisfy equation (2} for the pairwise supremum P = (a, E). Then this poset will be orthomodular.
Proof.
, and the orthomodularity property follows.
The concept of an orthocomplemented, orthomodular poset has been central to the lattice approach to quantum mechanics. As stated before, to arrive at a structure that has a Hilbert space representation, further assumptions are needed. We will study the consequences of assuming that there exists a symmetry group connected to the state of a set of experiments.
6 Symmetry and permissibility.
We assume that each sample space Xa is a locally compact topological space, and let X= {(a, x) :a E A, x E Xa} be the collection of all sample spaces. If X is given the topology composed of unions of sets of the form (a, Va), where Va is open in Xa, then X will also be locally compact. Now let G be a group of transformations on X. For single experiments it is known (Helland, 1998 , and references there) that-if simple consistency properties are satisfied -such a group may both simplify the statistical analysis, and allow a considerable strengthening of conclusions. We will here discuss consequences for sets of potential experiments of the assumption of the existence of a symmetry group.
The groups connected to single experiments may be looked upon a.s subgroups of G: Let Ga = {g E G: ga =a}. Then, by a slight misuse of notation, Ga will be considered to be a group of transformations of Xa. Another assumption is that in each model the parameter can be identified:
PO,(E) = P 0 (E) for all E E Fa implies 0' = 0.
{3)
As earlier it is assumed that all parameters 0 = Oa in E>a are functions of a single parameter ¢>from some space 4>. This is the parameter characterizing the state of the system, and it is natural to assume that all parameter transformations are generated by transformations of ¢>.
Assumption 3.
There is a group G of transformations on 4> such that the elements 9a of Ga all have the form (4)
The special parametric functions 0(·) = Oa(·) that satisfy a relation of the form (4) for some groups G and Ga played an important role in Helland (1998) , where I they were called invariantly estimable functions. They will be even more important here, and they will be referred to several times, also when no estimation is involved, so we will simply call these parametric functions permissible. The 
This is also a necessary condition for the identifiability condition (3).
(b) The set of transformations 9a described by the relation (4) Certain inconsistencies in Bayesian estimation theory are avoided if one concentrates on permissible parametric functions. Under weak additional assumptions on the loss function we also have that the best invariant estimator will be equal to the Bayes estimator under noninformative prior for such parameters. (Helland, 1998) Another homomorphism in the structure described above, is: ga -+ 9a (Ga -+ Ga)· It follows that Ga is the homomorphic image both of G and of Ga, which is a subgroup of G.
The following properties of permissible parametric functions are borrowed from Helland (1998) (iv) If { 1Ji; i E I} is any set of permissible parametric functions, then () given by
Note that the functions </>-+ P6(4>) (E) are not necessarily permissible even though the functions () are. This implication does hold, however, if the parameter B(·) is one-d.imensional and P depends montonically on it, since then the relation between ()and P will be 1-1.
7 Group representation related to the parameter space.
One very important aspect of locally compact groups of transformations is that one can define left and right invariant measures (Nachbin, 1965) 
where g E G and D ~ G. If <.P is also locally compact, and if the action of G on <.P satisfies a weak extra condition, then right Ha.ar measure can also be defined on <.P in a consistent way (Helland, 1998 , and references there). It is argued in Helland (1998) that from many points of view this right invariant measure is the correct one to use as a prior 'distribution' when G expresses the symmetry of the problem and no other information is present.
Linear representation of groups has played an increasing role in quantum mechanical calculations in the last decades, and in fact much of the motivation behind recent development of group representation theory as a mathematical discipline has been taken from quantum theory. Nevertheless, when it comes to the physical and mathematical foundation of quantum theory, little use has been made of group representations. An exception is Bohr and Ulfbeck (1995) , where physical aspects are emphasized.
We will concentrate here on the group G of transformations on the basic parameter space <.P. Assume that <.P is endowed with a a-algebra with a separability property (Dunford and Schwartz, 1958, p. 169) so that the space 1l = L 2 (<.P, v) of complex square integrable functions on <.P is separable. We take the measure v as right Haar measure.
The elements g E G generate unitary transformations on 1l by
Note that these transformations form a group which is the homomorphic image of the group G. A major issue in group representation theory is to study invariant subspaces under such transformations, in particular to look for irreducible invariant subs paces. experiments it may be of some interest to find minima under this ordering for certain sets of permissible functions. We will see below that equivalence classes of permissible functions are in one-to-one correspondence to subs paces of1l that are invariant under the groupgenerated class of unitary transformations (6), and that the ordering above corresponds to the natural ordering of subspaces. This may explain to a certain extent why group representation theory is so important in quantum mechanics.
Theorem 2. (a) Consider a fixed permissible function 0(·). The set of functions f of the form f(4>) = fo(O(</>)) constitutes a closed linear subspace of 1l which is invariant under the transformations U (g). (b) If 01 is a permissible function and 01 :::5 0, then the subspace corresponding to 01 is contained in the subspace corresponding to 0. Conversely, if V1 corresponds to 01 , V to 0, and V1 is a subspace ofV, then OI(·) :::50(·). (c) Say that two permissible parametric functions 0(·) and 0'(·) are equivalent if they are 1-1 functions of each other. Then the set of equivalence classes of permissible functions is in 1-1 correspondence with the subset of invariant subspaces of 1l described in (a). (d) Let V be a closed linear subspace of 1l which is invariant under the transformations U (g). Also assume that G is transitive on <I>, that it is exact, and that the group G is compact. Then there exists a permissible function 0(·) such that V is equal to the set of complex functions of the form fo(O(</>)) for some function fo.
Proof. Since Vis invariant and the group is compact, Vis spanned by a set of irreducible invariant spaces. Let {U(r) (g); r = 1, ... , k} be the irreducible representations in V of the group G, hence of the group {U(g)}, so that each matrix function U(r)(·) can be defined in a unique way and has dimension dr. Then by the spectral theorem for compact groups, any function !I(¢)= f(g) can be written
r=l
}(u(r)) = j f(g)U(r)(g)v(dg).

Taking 8(¢) = O(g) = (U(r)(g)
; r = 1, ... , k), the function f has the desired form, and (} is permissible. In general (} here will be complex, but it can be divided into a real and an imaginary part. The so defined (}can be replaced by any 1-1 function of it.
On the other hand, any function of a set of matrices can be written as a function of their elements; hence any fuction of this (} can be written in the form !I ( Ui~) (g); i, j = 1, ... , dr, r = 1, ... , k). Consider first the case where fi is a polynomial. Then this expression is a linear combination of products of terms of the form ui~)(g).
Such products may be regarded as elements of cartesian products. By using the Clebsch-Gordon series (e.g., Hammermesh, 1962, or any other group theory book for physicists), this can be reduced to linear combinations, that is, elements of the space spanned by functions, of the form (7). Hence all polynomial functions of (} belong to the invariant space. For the general case, take limits.
Corollary 1.
Assume transitive, exact and compact G. For a given invariant subspace V og 1i, the corresponding permissible function 8(¢) = O(g) can by taken as any real 1-1 function of the set of representation matrices corresponding to the irreducible invariant subspaces contained in V.
I Point (d) here and the corollary can be generalized to classes of n~ncompact groups by using more advanced spectral decomposition theorems (Barut and Rq,czka, 1977) . Then 0( ·) will in general have infinite dimension. The problem with exactness can probably be dealt with by the techniques of Helland (1998) and references there.
As is discussed more closely in Section 9 below, transitivity of G on <I> means that there is no superselection rules. In case of superselection rules, one can limit the discussion to one orbit. For physicists we refer to Bohr and Ulfbeck (1995) for a discussion of some relations between basic quantum theory and group representations.
It is well known, and easy to see, that the eigenspaces of all operators on 1l that commute with all U(g) are invariant. If {U(g)} is a Lie group with some generator A, these are the eigenspaces of operators that commute with A. This generates in general lots of invariant spaces, each of which according to Theorem 2 can be related in a unique way to an equivalence class of permissible parametric functions. In later developments we will need further properties of the Hilbert space 1l and those closed subspaces V of 1l that are defined by permissible parametric functions. Here is the kind of results that are needed.
Lemma 3. (a) Under weak regularity conditions the parameter group Ga of experiment fa will be locally compact and have a right Haar measure Va. Let J(-) be a given function on <I>. Then there is a unique (almost everywhere with respect to va) function fa ( 0) such that for all functions c( ·) of 0 we have
J c(Oa(tP))J(tjJ)v(d¢) = J c(O)fa(O)va(dO).
(8) 
Va to Oa(·). Let fi and fa be the corresponding functions defined in (a). Then, for all c1 (·) J CI(OI)ft(OI)vi(dOl) = J cl(OI(O))fa(O)va(dO).
(c) For all functions g on 8a we have Proof.
(a) We know that G is locally compact, and that Ga is the homomorphic image of G. Assuming that the function describing the homomorphism is continuous, Ga will inherit the topology from G, and then be locally compact. The measure f(¢>)v(d¢>) will be absolutely continuous with respect to va(d8); let fa(8) be the Radon-Nikodym derivative.
(b) This follows from well-known properties of Radon-Nikodym derivatives.
(c) By using (8) on c(8) = g(8)-fa(8), we find J if(¢>)-g(8a(¢>))i 2 v(d¢>)-J if(¢>)-fa(8a(¢>))i 2 v(d¢>) = J ig(8)-fa(8Wva(d8).
Equations (8) and (10) show that the function fa(8(¢>)) may be regarded as the projection off(¢>) on the space determined by the permissible function 8 (-) , and (9) shows that this projection functions as it should under iteration. This appears to be the start of a state vector approach to quantum mechanics based on a Hilbert space representation of G. We will come back to this approach later, but first we will return to the lattice approach, which leads to a (complementary) Hilbert space representation of propositions. The first part of the assumption below can be motivated as follows: If a(·) is a function of a set of parameters, and b( ·) is an extension of a using more parameters, then usually the values b will be smaller than the values a foi some parameter values, but in most cases there are also parameter values for which b is larger than a.
Lattice property and Hilbert space.
We let the vector space representation of permissible parametric functions from the previous section be understood.
Assumption 4.
(a) The supremum of a set of propositions {P;} , if it exists, will be some proposition P = (a, E) with probability PB(¢) (E) Proof. Assume a set of propositions Pi = (a;, E;) with probabilities P~\<P)(E;). What we are after, is a proposition P = (a, E) such that (11) for all i and for all </J, and such that P is the minimal proposition satisfying this. By Assumption 4(a) we can restrict our search to propositions P with parametric function fJ associated with a definite linear space V, the one spanned by the linear spaces of the parameters fJi. Now (11) for each <Pis equivalent to (12) where '1/J;(fJ(<jJ)) = 0;(</J), which makes sense by the nesting of the linear spaces and by Theorem 2 (b). By Assumption 4 (b) there exists at least one experiment with parameter fJ. Pick one such experiment. Then we can choose the E which minimizes the righthand side of (12) under this constraint for all fJ's. By the assumption of separability and continuity, such an E exists. If there are several experiments with the same parametric function, just take the one that minimizes the right hand side of (12). Propositions that give the same solution are identified by earlier assumptions. It is then clear that the supremum found is unique.
As a consequence of Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 we now have that, with the assumptions made, the set of propositions, constructed in a natural way from sets of potential experiment subject to symmetry conditions, form an orthomodular, orthocomplemented lattice. This is the basic entity of the quantum logic approach to quantum mechanics. We feel that most of the assumptions made are relatively innocent; they may perhaps be improved slightly in detail, but they have a more concrete interpretation than axioms for quantum mechanics in most existing approaches.
The remaining conditions from Section 3, atomicity, covering property and separability are more technical, and some of them have been controversial in some of the quantum logic literature. From a statistical point of view it is obvious that each sample space is the union of its atoms, but the corresponding assumption is more problematic if events with the same probability for each () are identified, as we have chosen to do here. And then we also have difficulties with the covering properties in models were atoms are undefined. On the other hand, with the identification of events, it is usually not problematical to assume that unions of disjoint events in each sample space are at most countable, and then by Assumption 2, the separability property follows.
A simple solution is to assume that all experiments are discrete, that is, that each sample space Xa is countable. Then all conditions are satisfied, and by arguments in Piron (1976), Maeda and Maeda (1970) , Varadarajan (1985) and other places, the ordinary Hilbert space model of quantum mechanics follows. Heuristically, continuous sample spaces may be approximated by discrete sample spaces. In fact, the situation at this point may be seen as a reflection of the situation in ordinary quantum mechanics, where it is well known that precise treatment of continuous variables requires other concepts than the ordinary Hilbert space approach, say based on C* algebras. Note that our own underlying framework with sets of models for experiments subject to symmetry is conceptually simple in the continuous case, too.
From the discussion in Beltrametti and Cassinelli (1981) 
where p = p( <P) is a density operator, a non-negative operator of trace 1.
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Here we have combined the Theorem on existence of the Hilbert space with the famous Gleason's Theorem, which states that if the dimension of the Hilbert space is 3 or larger, every probability distribution over propositions can be computed in this way. Gleason's theorem is very cumbersome to prove (Varadarajan, 1985) . We will indicate later that the state vector representation of Section 7 probably may be used to give a simpler proof of this result.
Corollary 2.
The conclusion of Theorem 4 holds under only the Assumptions 1, 3 and 4.
Proof. As it stands, Theorem 4 is deduced using all assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4. As remarked earlier, however, it is always possible to extend the set of propositions so that Assumption 2 holds. This extended set of propositions do not occur in the statement (13).
All that have been done up to now could also have been done for a simple case of a distributive lattice. Then as in Theorem 4 we would still have been given a Hilbert space, but this Hilbert space had been trivial. Hence, a further question to ask is if the quantum logic derived from sets of experiments is non-distributive, in general. In some sense this is obvious, since if it were distributive, we would have an ordinary Boolean algebra, which by a well-known theorem by Stone would imply that everything could be represented as one single experiment. Here is a simple example of non-distributivity. More complicated examples can be constructed from this. Example 1.
Look at two experiments t'a =(X, F, {Po}) and £b = (Y, 9, {Q.p} ). Let A, BE .1", A, B =fi X, but AU B = X, and let C E g, C =fi 0. Assume that the two experiments are unrelated in the sense that () and ' ljJ depend on the common parameter ¢ in disjoint parts of its range <I>. Also assume that Po(A) = Po(B) = Q.p(C) = 0 in the areas where these are independent of the parameters. Then (a, A c) V (b, cc) is some prop~r sition (e, D) whose probability for all¢ should dominate max (Po(.p 
)(Ac), Q.p(.p)(Cc)).
But, from the assumptions made, this maximum must be 1 for all¢. b, C) . So these three events do not satisfy the distributive law.
Finally, one can ask if the quantum logic derived from sets of potential experiment is wide enough to cover everything that is of interest in quantum mechanics. Of course, it is very ambitious to try to give an answer to such a question, but it is an encouraging thought that virtually every attempt that can be made to verify any theory on the quantum level has to be based on experiments. Hence it seems very difficult to trancend beyond this frame. (However, this argument does perhaps not hold for quantum cosmology.)
Observables.
In Section 7 we introduced a group representation of the transformation group G in the parameter space, and looked at some concrete interpretations of that representation in Theorem 2. The Hilbert space of Theorem 4 can in some sense be regarded as the corresponding representation of the sample space group G. Even though the consequences of this latter representation are discussed in all books in quantum mechanics, we will come with some remarks on it here.
Since we have assumed that all sample spaces Xa are discrete (this is not necessary for our basic model, but convenient for the Hilbert space representation), we might as well assume that Xa = {1, 2, ... } for each a. The a-algebra is then the obvious one, and there is a parametric class of probabilities {P~q,)(x); (} E Sa}, adding to 1 for each a. As elsewhere it is assumed that the parameter in each experiment is a function of a state parameter <P E 4>. The most important assumptions that we have made, apart from that the class of experiments should be rich enough, is that pairwise orthogonality should imply total orthogonality in the sense of (1) and that there exists a group structure on 4> with the consistency requirement Oa(9<P) = 9a(Oa(<P)) for some Ya· We will also assume here that G is transitive on 4>; the case with several orbits corresponds to superselection rules: Index the orbits with some parameter r. Then r is conserved during all symmetry transformations. Using a reasonable theory of time development, it can also be shown to be conserved over time. Physical variables with this property might be charge, mass or hypercharge. In the further discussion there is nothing lost by keeping r fixed, which is the same as sticking to one particular orbit, so that G is transitive.
The simplest quantummechanical interpretation of (13) is now that each primitive event (a, x) can be represented in a fixed complex separable Hilbert space 1io by a one-dimensional projection: For each a we may take a set of orthonormal vectors {ea,x}, so that the event (a,x) is represented by the projection ea,xe!.x· In concrete terms this means that according to Gleason's theorem there exists a density operator p such that P 8 (.p)(x) = e!,xPea,x· It is not difficult to see that it is always possible to find one such p for each experiment; the strong part of this result is that the same p can be chosen for all the experiments.
In each experiment one can of course introduce random variables in the usual statistical sense: Y(·), Z(·), ... are measurable functions on some Xa, and the distributions of these are determined in the usual way from {Pe(.p)(x)} above. Again, the main thing that is new in quantum theory, is that there is some connection between variables defined in different experiments, and this connection may have rather large consequences. It may be natural, since probabilities are summarized through projection operators, to associate random variables originally defined in an experiment
Ea with operators, too: If Y(x) = Yx for x E Xa, then take (14) The implication from Gleason's theorem is then that in any state p the expecta-
Again take p = eet for some unit vector e. This is a formal way of generalizing the notion of random variables in such a way that it makes sense for several experiments, a conceptual idea that may be of interest in ordinary statistics, too. Some technical problems associated with this notion of observables are discussed in Gudder (1978) .
States.
It is now time to leave the habit of only associating the concept of state with fixed values of the hyperparameter ¢. Two fundamental observations lead to this: 1) So far, nothing has been said about the state space <I>, except that there should be defined a group G on it. From that point of view, there is nothing to prevent us each¢ is replaced by any parameter value that is mapped upon¢, or more generally, by a prior measure on these ¢'.
2) Since the density operator p in (13) is a weighted average of pure state density operators, it is reasonable to have the lefthand side also as a measure over 'pure states' in some sense expressed by ¢. It is this argument that we now will try to make more precise.
Again, since we in the derivation of (13) have assumed that each Xa is discrete, we might as well replace E by a singleton { x}. In Section 9 we used ITa,x = ea,xe!,x, but this is not needed here. We will assume that x is nontrivial in the sense that P 0 a(<l>)(x) > 0 for at least one¢.
If we now replace ¢ by an average according to some prior probability measure Tp ( ·) on <1>, the equation reads (16) Look first at the case where p = eiei is a pure state. Then (16) is (17) Since it is clear from (16) and (17) 
may concentrate on (17). Now turn to the arbitrariness in the choice of <1> as remarked in 1) above. A natural requirement is that <1> should be chosen in some minimal way, subject to the requirement that it should serve as a hyperparameter space for all the experiments in questions. In fact the concept of minimality can be made completely precise we have the ordering ::::! of parametric functions.
We will for simplicity assume that each Ti is absolutely continuous with respect to the right G-Haar measure v(·) on <1>. (19) for some function fi· Using the projection defined in Lemma 3, each such expression can be projected onto a space Va corresponding to the parametric function 0~. Take 1i as the minimal linear space spanned by {Va : a E .A}. We will assume regularity conditions (cf, Theorem 2(d)) such that 1i corresponds to aunique (hyper-)parametric function </>(</>' ). This means, again using Lemma 3, that all dashes can be removed from the expression (19). When ri(-) is not absolutely continuous, a limiting argument must be used.
(b) Look at the lefthand side of equation (17) when ci> is minimal, and fix i.
Assume that Ti(·) can not be chosen as Dirac measure. Then, by projecting upon all the spaces corresponding to the Oa(·), there is a nontrivial measure left which do not concern any of the parameters, contradicting the assumption that ci> is minimal.
Thus Ti(·) has to be Dirac on some value <l>i· This means that (18) holds.
The result of Theorem 5 establishes a connection between the two Hilbert spaces of this paper, and is in some sense close to giving an independent proof of Gleason's theorem. And it also gives a link to ordinary statistical models.
Suppose that an ideal measurement has been done. This means that some experiment E:a has been performed, and this has been so accurate that we afterwards can assume that the corresponding parameter is exactly determined: Oa(<l>) = 00 • From a statistical point of view is clear that such a measurement must have consequences for what is predicted in future measurement, and hence also on the state. Assume that the state before measurement is given by a density matrix p, hence a prior measure Tp(·), so that the result x in experiment E:a is given by both sides of (16). After the measurement is done, the new state -i.e., the new measureshould be restricted to cl>a = {¢>: Oa(¢>) = Oo}. By suitably parametrizing cl>a (we can find a permissible parametrization since Oa is permissible) this again amounts to a projection in the sense of Lemma 3. The well-known Gleason Theorem solution emerges, namely to replace p by rrprr, normalized, where rr projects on the set of state vectors corresponding to those </>for which Oa ( </>) = Oo.
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In some early quantum mechanical literature, such results were comprehended as somewhat mysterious, as reflected in the term 'collapse of the wave packet'. From a statistical point of view it is well known that models must be changed when new information is obtained. Bayesian statistics has put this way of thinking into a system, also for non-ideal measurements. However, the idea is well-known also in non-Bayesian statistics.
Measurement theory: Statistical inference theory.
The measurement theory of von Neumann (1955) has been criticized by several authors, mainly because of difficulties with giving a precise division between the microscopic system and the macroscopic measuring device.
The statistical approach can offer a well documented, well understood and extremely well tested solution to the measurement problem: Suppose that some specific experiment fa has been performed. Statistical inference theory to estimate the parameter 0 of such an experiment is far developed, see for instance Lehmann (1983) . A difficulty is that this does not usually determine the state ¢>. This may however be solved using an objective Bayes approach; see below. In Section 4 above the extreme set Ao of experiments was defined. Areasonable conjecture is that under regularity conditions, when an experiment belongs to A0 , there is 1-1 correspondence between 0 and ¢>. This seems to be supported by observing the Hilbert space solution for this case.
In Malley and Hornstein (1993) statistical inference specifically for the quantun situation is discussed.
In the present context it is natural to make use of the symmetry properties of the quantum situation, also in the inference phase. This was done in a general setting in Helland (1998) . We will only briefly recapitulate one main results adapted to the quantum theory solution proposed here.
Assume that to start with we have no information about the system, so that the Haar prior v on <I> with respect to the basic group G is used. Then we perform an experiment fa with parametric function 0(¢>). The experiment results in the measurement of a random variable X -which is taken as a point in the sample space, and can be multidimensional or even more general. We assume that the group Ga on the sample space Xa of the experiment is known. For simplicity it is assumed that this group is transitive, and also that G is transitive on <I> (no superselection rules). In general one can condition upon orbits. The probability density on the sample space Xa is known as a function of</>, for simplicity this is taken as a density p,p(x) with respect to the measure lla on Xa generated by Haar measure ~~~ on Ga;
The main question is now how cjJ shall be estimated; i.e., one wants an estimator J(X) which is as close as possible to c/J. To specify what we mean by closeness, we need to specify a loss function. Assume for simplicity that cjJ is a vector parameter (in some Rk), and that quadratic loss is used. Then the solution is
This solution is best in two different ways: It is the best equivariant ('permissible') estimator, and it minimizes the Bayes loss, that is, the expected loss with respect to the aposteriori distribution when the prior is Haar as above.
By consistency, (} = 0( cjJ) must have a similar formula with P<P ( x) replaced by qo(x), where P<P(x) = qB(<P) (x) . On the other hand, it seems reasonable, and it is in fact optimal, to estimate any 1!(¢) by the formula (20) 12 Time evolution and the role of Planck's constant.
So far the description has been static; we will now try briefly to take time development into account. The point of departure is that we have defined the state of the system as some parameter cjJ in some space 4>. In practice this state can develop with time in many different ways. A simple and physically plausible assumption is that there is a continuous group K acting on 4> such that cjJ after time t changes to ktc/J, where kt E K.
In Section 7 we discussed a unitary representation of the symmetry group G of 4> on a Hilbert space 11.. Assume that one can find a unitary representation of K also on 1l. Since K is a continuous group, a well-known theorem by Stone implies that the representation then must be of the form U(t) = eiAt for some selfadjoint operator A, perhaps after rescaling time. As is demonstrated in several books, taking A = -H/n here, where n is Planck's constant and H is the Hamiltonian, leads to the Schrodinger equation. This is the first time that Planck's constant appears in this paper, a rather significant observation. Everything that has been said on stochastical models, and most of what we have said about symmetry, apply also to large-scale problems. Planck's constant appears only when we meet the following fact, most recently commented on by Alfsen and Schultz (1998) : Physical variables play a dual role, as observables and as generators of transformation groups. It is when observators are used as generators of groups the proportionality constant 1i occurs. One example is the Hamiltonian and the Schrooinger equation, another example is the translation group in some direction, say the x-axis, whose unitary representation is of the form exp(ipxf1i), with 1x being the momentum in the x-direction.
A large scale example.
Most socalled paradoxes of quantum mechanics seem to disappear in the statistical setting described here. Take the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox for example (in the form proposed by David Bohm): A composite particle with spin 0 disintegrates into two single particles, whose spin components in any direction then necessarily add to 0, hence are opposite. Sometimes the fact that an observation of one particle implies the knowledge of the spin component of the other particle in the same direction, is taken as some action at a distance. One point is that the observer of the first particle is free to choose the direction in which he wants to measure. In the language of the present paper this observer chooses one particular experiment. No paradox appears when we have a statistical interpretation of experiments in mind.
The following macroscopic example seems to be fairly similar: An organizer 0 sends two envelopes I and II to each of two persons A and B, situated at different places. In envelope I he has the choice between a red card or a black card; either rei to A or black to B or the opposite. In envelope II he has the choice between a. card with the letter 1 or a card with the letter 2; either 1 to A and 2 to B or the opposite. Now 0 for simplicity chooses to have probability 1/2 for red to A in envelope I, and he also chooses probability 1/2 for 1 to A in envelope II. However, he may insist that there should be some correlation 'Y between the two envelopes to A, for instance defined by 1
where -1 ~ 'Y ~ 1. Correlation at B, defined in the same way, will then necessarily also be 'Y. The initial state of the system is then determined, since we know the probability distribution of any experiment that A and B could choose to do. To make completely concrete that some randomness is involved, one can imagine several independent I pairs ( A1, Bl), ... , (An, Bn) , all in the same state, that is, under the same joint probability distribution generated by 0. Imagine now that the following happens: A is given the order that he should open one and only one envelope. Once he has opened one envelope, the other one is destroyed (by some mechanism which is irrelevant here). A is therefore given the choice between two noncompatible experiment, exactly the situation discussed in this paper. If he opens envelope I and finds a red card, he can make one set of predictions concerning the content of B's two envelopes; if he opens envelope II and sees the number 2, he can make another set of predictions, etc.. The situation is in fact very similar to the EPR-experiment. There is no action at a distance, only predictions conditioned on different information.
It may be of some interest to go somewhat deeper into this example, at least to calculate the necessary probability distributions. While the initial state of the system is easy to find, the state after A has opened his envelope is determined by his result ('ideal measurement'). There are 4 possibilities, hence 4 states of the system (in addition to the specification of I· In all cases, the purpose of the state specification is to label the relevant probability distributions for the outcome of B's opening of envelopes.
To begin with, we discard from B's mechanism of opening envelopes. Then any state simply describes a probability distribution over the 4 possible card combinations forB: rl, r2, b1, b2, where r is red and b is black. A simple calculation shows that this probability distribution in any case can be written P(r1) = I(l + 1)¢1 P(r2) = 2 (1 -1)¢2 P(b1) = 1(1-1)¢3 P(b2) = !(1+1)¢4, Since this latter transformation is 1-1 in Oi, this parameter will always be permissible in this example, in whatever way one defines the parametric function.
However, the following concept is of interest in general, and specifically in this example: Pick a set A1 of potential experiments. Then the set {(a, Oa) : a E AI} may be called permissible if there is a group G1 on A1 such that (i) 91a E A1
whenever a E A1 and 91 E G1, and (ii) (g1a, 0 91 a(9</>)) is a function of (a, Oa(<l>) ) for all choices of g1, g. This is equivalent to permissibility of the parameter in a compound experiment, where </ > is augmented by a randomization parameter g1a.
In the present example, the 3 transformations corresponding to P/ ( r) ~ P/ (b), Pfl(1) ~ Pfl(2) and I~ II (change envolope) constitute such a structure. The smallest homomorphic image of s4 which supports this structure, is s3, which is noncommutative and has an interesting 2-dimensional irreducible representation.
Several concepts of this paper may be illustrated on this simple example, if necessary by using the structure just described. Alternatively, the example could have been made more complicated to start with, so that each experiment supported a group with a nontrivial irreducible representation. These (not quite trivial) exercises will be left to the interested reader.
14 Discussion.
Throughout this paper we have stated some assumptions; in addition there are several implicit assumptions of more technical/ mathematical type. Though most of these assumptions are rather plausible, we are not completely sure that all of them will be satisfied in all details in a future hypothetical theory. Their main function here have been to pave the way to ordinary quantum mechanics from what is our basic framework: Set of models for experiments with a common state space, subject to some symmetry group.
Our conceptual framew~rk works both for continuous and for discrete variables, and, apart from the discussion of time evolution, there is not much non-relativistic about it. A very interesting -but probably not trivial -question is therefore to what extent it can be developed further in a relativistic setting, perhaps even with large symmetry groups of the kind that are natural to think of in the contexts of general relativity.
Of some interest in this connection are the views expressed by Dirac {1978): He wanted relativistic quantum mechanics to take another direction, and explicitly mentioned group representations of the Poincare group as a clue to this direction.
In the same paper, Paul Dirac expressed the following opinion: 'One should keep the need for a sound mathematical basis dominating one's search for a new theory, Any physical or philosophical idea that one has must be adjusted to the mathematics. Not the other way around.' I strongly agree with Dirac that any fundamental physical theory should have a sound mathematical basis. In fact, much of the motivation behind the present paper has been to find just that. However, every mathematical theory building must be based on a set of axioms. It may well be that the axioms found by mathematicians using aesthetic or quasi-logical criteria are among the right ones to serve as a basis for a physical theory, but these criteria alone often leaves one with too much arbitrariness. In fact, and unfortunately, much formalistic theory has been the result of only taking such points of departure. To find the basis for a new theory, one must endeavor to look in all directions, draw upon all sources whether they relate to common sense, experience, mathematics, philosophy or large scale physics. This implies extremely difficult requirements on the developer of theories, and intuitive reasoning and even imprecise arguments seem to be unavoidable at intermediate stages of the development. Having said that, however, at the final stage mathematical rigor should be imperative.
It can be inferred from the ideas of this paper that much of what has been said about modelling in microcosmos also can be transferred to macrocosmos. In fact, large scale examples showing quantum mechanical behavior has recently been demonstrated in the physical literature {Aerts, 1996). As indicated above: Several examples of this type can be constructed.
Having stressed the similarities between models of quantum theory and those of statistics in this paper, it should also of course be underlined that there are basic differences. In statistics the parameters are always regarded as unknown and subject to inference; in quantum physics the states/ parameters can often be regarded as known. Also, the rich set of symmetries that is typical for all applications of quantum theory, seldom find their counterpart, at least not to a similar degree, in large scale statistics.
Nevertheless, even though it is not a main issue here, it should be mentioned that
